An (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal Policy: the Case of Italian Public Debt by Marattin, Luigi & Marzo, Massimiliano
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal
Policy: the Case of Italian Public Debt
Luigi Marattin and Massimiliano Marzo
University of Bologna
January 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6880/
MPRA Paper No. 6880, posted 25. January 2008 19:32 UTC
 1
A (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal Policy:  
the Case of Italian Public Debt 
 
                                              Luigi Marattin*                        Massimiliano Marzo÷ 
                                      (University of Bologna)              (University of Bologna) 
January 2008 
 
                                                                             Abstract 
 
Using the simple arithmetic of government budget constraint, we 
perform an analysis on the Italian case, investigating the consequences 
on the main public finance aggregates of the adoption of a fiscal policy 
rule responding to past real debt/GDP ratio. Such a rule, firmly 
grounded in the economic analysis, would allow the reduction of Italy's 
outstanding stock of debt without requiring the strict adherence to the 
3% criterion for deficit/GDP ratio, as prescribed by SGP. We perform a 
forecasting exercise under five alternative scenarios, analyze the details 
of a structural debt reduction strategy with alternative yearly step, and 
finally carry out a counterfactual exercise by applying our proposed rule 
to the period 1994-2006. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early Nineties, most western economies had to undertake various processes of fiscal 
consolidation, aimed at reducing both public debt and deficits and achieve more solid fiscal positions. 
For EU economies, this path took the form of the run-up to the Euro (pre-1998) and the struggle to 
comply to the Stability and Growth Pact (before and after the 2005 reform), which governs the 
necessary coordination of Member States' fiscal policies after the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union. Episodes of fiscal consolidations have been often studied in the economic literature. 
In one of the most comprehensive of these studies, Alesina and Perotti (1997) examine a full sample of 
OECD countries (and then focus on Denmark, Ireland and Italy), and find that adjustments relying on 
government expenditure cuts had a better chance of being successful and expansionary; on the other 
hand, if they are based on tax increases and cuts in public investments, tend not to be non-persistent 
and contractionary. 
However, the policy debate on the issue is still far from reaching a widespread consensus on the 
public finance objectives that are most suited to modern economies, and on the strategies to achieve 
them. There is indeed consensus on the need to reduce debt/GDP ratios, as an excessive accumulation 
of government liabilities puts upward pressures on interest and inflation rates, crowds-out private 
spending and employs too many resources to debt service payments; such a requirement is even more 
binding in a monetary union, in order to prevent spillover effects. Nonetheless, the policy debate still 
seem to devote the best attention on deficit/GDP ratios: in particular, EMU public finance criteria 
prevents member states to exceed the 3% ceiling in that respect. The reform of the SGP, in March 
2005, confirms this parameter, although emphasizing the importance of the whole debt reduction 
strategy. 
This paper carries out a simple but meaningful exercise: based on the simple arithmetic of 
public finance, we assume the existence of a fiscal policy rule in which fiscal pressure responds to past 
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real debt/GDP ratio; we distinguish between tax revenue not immediately responding to 
macroeconomic variables ("independent taxation") and tax revenue which is promptly available to 
policy-makers to be manoeuvred in response to, in our case, accumulation of government liabilities. In 
this second group we adopt the strict definition of "fiscal pressure", that is the sum of direct and 
indirect taxation; we chose to put social contributions into independent taxation, since governments 
tend to manoeuvre this source of revenue mainly in reference to sustainability of pensions systems, 
rather than macroeconomic stabilization. We calibrate the resulting debt dynamics equation with 2007 
data, and perform a number of simulation regarding the evolution of public finance aggregates, under 
alternative macroeconomic scenarios, for the period 2008-2026. We also carry out a counterfactual 
exercise, applying our feedback fiscal rule to the period 1994-2006, to analyze what would have 
happened if the government had followed explicitly a kind of fiscal rule such as the one we propose. 
The whole analysis is targeted at the italian case, given the outstanding stock of public debt, which 
make Italy the only nation in Europe (and one of the few in the world) with a debt/GDP ratio above the 
100% threshold. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 sets the simple framework and the 
proposed fiscal rule, briefly discussing the related theoretical issues, while section 3 calibrates the 
model with the latest official data available. Section 4 proceeds with the simulations, divided in three 
different steps: the short-term evolution of public finance aggregates according to the fiscal policy 
parameter chosen, the medium-long term evolution under five alternative macroeconomic scenarios, 
and the discussion on alternative debt reduction strategy (featured by a yearly step of, respectively, 1% 
and 2%) using our proposed fiscal rule. Section 5 performs a counterfactual exercise, applying our 
fiscal rule to the period 1994-2006 and comparing actual debt/GDP  and deficit / GDP series with 
simulated ones. Section 6 concludes, discusses some policy implications and possible future 
extensions. 
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2. The framework:debt/GDP dynamics and fiscal rule 
The basic dynamic of public debt is: 
                                                            Bt  1  itBt−1  PtGt − Tt                                                (1) 
where: 
 Bt,t−1   = stock of nominal public debt 
 it  = nominal interest rate 
 PtGt − Tt  = primary deficit in nominal terms 
Few simple algebraic steps (to be found in the Appendix) leads to the following: 
 
                                                        
bt  bt−1  it − t − gtbt−1  Gt − TtYt                                       (2) 
where: 
  bii  t, t − 1    real public debt/GDP ratio 
  gt  = rate of growth of real GDP at time  t   
 t   rate of inflation at time  t   
 
Gt−Tt
Yt
   primary deficit / GDP ratio 
Rearranging the terms: 
                                                               
Tt − Gt
Yt
 it − t − gtbt−1  Δbt
                                       (3) 
  where  Δbt   is the desired debt/GDP reduction at the end of time  t   and it is defined as: 
 
                                                                         Δbt  −bt − bt−1                                                       (4) 
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Literature on fiscal policy has always based its considerations on the analysis of government 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
                                                                       
Bt
Pt
 Et∑
j0

jTtj − Gtj 
                                         (5) 
Equation (5) simply states that the stock of real debt at time  t   must be equal to the current value of 
future primary surpluses. Different opinions on the nature of that relationship gave rise to two 
alternative theories of price level determination. In fact, if we interpret (5) as a constraint given the 
price level  Pt,   it implies that the government is obliged to generate current or future primary 
surpluses in case it looses control on the evolution of public debt; under this theory,  Pt   is entirely 
determined by the monetary policy authority, according to the standard prediction of the Quantitative 
Theory of Money. If, instead, we view (5) as an equilibrium relationship that has to hold under any 
circumstances, it means that if nominal debt increases, primary surpluses do not necessarily have to 
change accordingly: adjustment might occur via change in the price level, so to guarantee the fulfilment 
of the equilibrium relationship. Thus, fiscal indiscipline can cause a movement in  Pt;  not surprisingly, 
this simple interpretation gave rise in the 90s to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Sims 1994, 
Cochrane 2001, Woodford 2001 and many others), arguing that price level determination is not 
necessarily a merely monetary issue. Emphasizing the inflationary pressures implied by accumulation 
of excessive public debt, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level is, at least partially, at the heart of the 
theoretical justifications of the public finance requirements for the European Monetary integration 
process.  As first showed by Leeper 1991, the kind commitment for government, implied by the above 
considerations, can be achieved by the introduction of a fiscal rule such as: 
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Tt  T0   Bt−1Pt                                                       (6) 
 
with  0    1  being the elasticity of (lump-sum) taxation to the past stock of real public debt, and  
T0   being that component of tax revenue which moves independently from debt dynamics. With such a 
rule, government adjust fiscal pressure so to respond to accumulation of past nominal liabilities 
deflated at the current price level. In the Leeper's terminology, such a rule depicts a "passive" policy, as 
the fiscal authority is not free to choose a decision rule that depends on current or expected future 
variables, but has to passively adjust direct taxes in order to balance the budget, being constrained by 
the active authority (the monetary policy one) and, in microfounded frameworks, by consumers’ 
optimization. Under assumption of active monetary policy (responding more than proportionally to an 
increase in inflation) as it seems widely established in modern economies, Leeper derives the 
conditions for equilibrium determinacy with regard to the fiscal policy rule, which implies the 
parameter     lying in the following range: 
 
                                                                    −1 − 1    −1  1                                                    (7) 
 
where     is the intertemporal rate of preferences by which consumers discount utility in the next 
period and that is equal, in dynamic general equilibrium models, to the steady-state real interest rate. 
As the value commonly accepted in the literature for     ranges from 0.95 to 0.99 (corresponding, 
respectively, to a real net interest rate ranging from 5.26% to 1.01%), we see that the range of values of  
   consistent with determinacy is very wide to ensure that with a fiscal rule such as (6), there is no risk 
of an explosive path for the price level even in the presence of a nominal debt shock, since the feedback 
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rule ensures that the government will modify fiscal pressure so to keep constant the value of real debt. 
Therefore, this kind of fiscal rule is the one most suited to target a specific strategy of public debt 
reduction, while preserving price stability. 
On the basis of this theoretical background, we borrow the above fiscal rule and verify its usage in a 
debt-reduction strategy based on the Italian case. Equation (6) can be modified so as to account for 
measures relative to GDP, as we did in (2). 
 
Tt
Yt
 T0Yt  
Bt−1
PtYt  
 
Tt
Yt
 T0Yt  
Bt−1
Pt−1Yt−1
Pt−1
Pt
Yt−1
Yt  
 
                                                        
Tt
Yt
 T0Yt  
bt−1
1  t  gt                                                  (8) 
 
(8) is a fiscal rule which makes the fiscal pressure at time  t   (measured by the amount of total tax 
revenue relative to GDP) responding to the past real debt/GDP ratio, deflated by the current inflation 
rate and real GDP growth. 
Inserting the fiscal rule (8) into the debt/GDP dynamics (equation 2), we obtain: 
      
bt  bt−1  GtYt  it − t − gtbt−1 −
T0
Yt
−  bt−11  t  gt  
                                   
bt  GtYt −
T0
Yt
 1  it − t − gt − 1  t  gt bt−1                              (9) 
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3. Data and calibration 
In order to calibrate the simple model, we use data from the Nota di aggiornamento al DPEF per gli 
anni 2008-2011, the main policy paper that Italian government utilizes in order to define the public 
finance intertemporal framework. Data refer to year 2007. Latest news anticipation about Italy's public 
finance (to be officially released at the end of march 2008) give better results on 2007; nevertheless, we 
stick to the latest official news available. Furthermore, we have to consider that our exercise aim at 
providing some general and useful insights, more than representing a proper forecasting exercise; the 
analysis can easily be updated along with the release of new data. 
 
TABLE 1 
debt service / GDP 2007 2006
2007
i B
Y
4.82% 
debt/GDP 2006
2006
B
Y
 106.8%
primary government expenditure /GDP 2007
2007
G
Y
 44.19%
tax revenue / GDP 2007
2007
T
Y
 46.6% 
independent taxation / GDP 0
2007
T
Y
 17.10%
euro-wide nominal interest rate  ECBti 4% 
GDP real growth 2007g  1.9% 
inflation 2007π  1.9% 
 
 
Obviously interest rate on government debt does not exactly corresponds to the level of short-term 
interest rate, which in the euro area is set by the European Central Bank; in order to pin down the 
effective measure, we divide the debt service by the stock of public debt with respect to the GDP: 
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i2007
B2006
Y2006
 4.82%
i2007106.8%  4.82%
i2007  4.51%  
We obtain an average implicit interest rate of 4.51%, which is consistent with an official ECB rate of 
4%, augmented by a small spread. 
It is important to stress that data for  
T2007
Y2007   include all tax revenue (direct and indirect taxation, social 
contributions and other types of revenues), whereas  
T2007−T0
Y2007   is the proper definition of fiscal pressure1, 
and it is the component who respons to public debt movements. 
Let us calibrate the fiscal policy parameter     according to our fiscal rule (equation 8): 
0.466 − 0.1710  2007 1.0681  0.019  0.019
2007  0.2867  
Italian government fiscal stance for the year 2007 implied, therefore, that tax revenue/GDP ratio 
response to increases in the stock of public debt over GDP is equal to 0.2867. 
 
4. Simulations 
4.1. The evolution of public finance aggregates at the end of time  t   
Using data from previous section, we now use equation (9) in order to calculate the possible evolution 
of public debt, and other fiscal policy aggregates, at the end of time  t   as a function of the parameter  
   (elasticity of tax revenue to debt/GDP ratio). We also distinguish the  2007   (calibrated as above) 
                                                 
1We calibrated it so to include only direct and indirect taxation, since social contributions are increasingly meant to respond 
to sustainability of pensions systems rather than public debt evolution. 
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and the   stab  , the value of     that stabilizes the debt/GDP ratio at the same level as 2006. All the 
experiments are carried out under the assumption that public expenditure's share of GDP is kept 
constant at the 2006 level. 
Here is the figure picturing the evolution of the fiscal variables: 
FIGURE 1 
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The following table shows the corresponding quantitative values as we pick, alternatively, the fiscal 
policy parameter calibrated as in 2007 ( 2007  0.2867 ) or the value that stabilizes the debt/GDP 
ratio at the 2006 level (  stab  0.2707 ). 
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TABLE 2  
φ  2007
2007
B
Y
 2007
2007
D
Y
 2007 2007
2007
G T
Y
−  2007
2007
T
Y
 2007 2006
2007
i B
Y
 
2007φ =0.2867 105.15% 2.41% -2.41% 46.60% 4.74% 
stabφ =0.2707 106.8% 4.05% -0.76% 44.95% 4.82% 
 
 
Not surprisingly, given our calibration procedure, the first line pins down exactly the predictions of 
Italian government for the year 2007. The second line shows the behaviour of main fiscal aggregates if 
the government adopts a strategy of debt/GDP stabilization; as we see, the ceiling of 3% for the deficit 
/GDP ratio would be violated by a considerable extent. 
 
4.2. Evolution of fiscal variables over time 
 
We now carry out a simple exercise regarding the evolution of fiscal policy variables over time from 
the year 2008 onwards, under given values of other macroeconomic variables. In particular, we analyse 
the following scenarios: 
TABLE 3  
BASELINE SCEN. 1 SCEN. 2 SCEN.3 SCEN.4 SCEN.5 
φ =0.2867 φ =0.2867 φ =0.2867 φ =0.2867 φ =0.30 φ =0.30 
t
t
G
Y
=44.19% t
t
G
Y
=44.19% t
t
G
Y
=44.19% t
t
G
Y
 gradual cut t
t
G
Y
=44.19% t
t
G
Y
 gradual cut
0
t
T
Y
=17.10% 
 
0
t
T
Y
=17.10% 
 
0
t
T
Y
=17.10%
 
0
t
T
Y
=17.10% 
 
0
t
T
Y
=17.10% 
 
0
t
T
Y
=17.10% 
 
tπ =1.9% tπ =2.4% tπ =1.5% tπ =1.9% tπ =1.9% tπ =1.9% 
ECB
ti =4% 
 
ECB
ti =5% 
 
ECB
ti =3% 
 
ECB
ti =4% 
 
ECB
ti =4% 
 
ECB
ti =4% 
 
tg =1.9% tg =1.1% tg =2.5% tg =1.9% tg =1.9% tg =1.9% 
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Scenario 1 depicts "bad" macroeconomic conditions, with the rate of growth falling slightly above 1%, 
inflation accelerating to 2.4%, and tight credit conditions (nominal interest rate at 5%). Conversely, 
scenario 2 depicts "good" macroeconomic environment, with low inflation and interest rate, and real 
growth in line (or slightly above) potential. The first two scenarios are analyzed under given fiscal 
policy stance (same public expenditure/GDP ratio and same feedback parameter). Scenario 3 comes 
back to "medium" macro conditions, but with a reduction of (primary) public expenditure of 1% per 
annum, for four years (so to reach the value of  40.19%  of GDP); scenario 4 uses a stronger feedback 
response to past debt/GDP ratio (   =0.30), whereas scenario 5 is a mix of scenarios 3 and 4, thereby 
representing the more rigid fiscal scenario. 
The next two subsections look at the evolution of the main fiscal aggregates under the five 
alternative scenarios, from 2008 to 2026 and, on the other hand, analyze the consequences of precise 
debt reduction strategies with, alternatively, a 1% and 2% yearly reduction step. 
 
4.2.1. The path to 2026. 
The following table depicts the evolution of fiscal aggregates under the alternative scenarios. Here is 
the debt/GDP ratio: 
FIGURE 2 
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
DEBT/GDP RATIO
base
scen1
scen2
scen3
scen4
scen5
 
 
Under baseline scenario (that is,  2007  0.2867 ),debt reduction is quite slow, and converges to a 
level slightly above 100% of GDP. Bad (scenario 1) and good (scenario 2) macro conditions, 
respectively, worsen and improve the debt reduction trajectory, keeping constant the fiscal stance. 
Scenario 4 (   0.30 ) produces almost exactly the same trajectory as scenario 2, meaning that 
increasing the response of tax revenue to last year debt/GDP to the level of  0.30  can substitute for 
adverse macroeconomic conditions. The best results are achieved under scenarios 3 and 5, depicting a 
1% per year reduction of primary public expenditure from 2008 to 2012; scenario 5 achieves best 
results, initially, because it implies a stronger response to last year debt. 
The evolution of deficit / GDP ratio is interesting: 
 
 
 14
FIGURE 3  
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Under baseline and scenario 1, it increases steadily until it reaches (respectively), 3.82% and 3.69%. 
The reason is that since tax revenue is proportional to the debt/GDP ratio, as the latter decreases, the 
former decreases accordingly; since public expenditure is kept constant, deficit increases over time. 
Better macroeconomic conditions (scenario 2) make the deficit reduction stronger initially, and we 
have confirmation that scenarios 2 and 4 produce pretty much the same dynamics (although the 
convergence level are slightly different). Reduction of public expenditure (scenario 3 and 5) produce 
the best results, but if they are not accompanied by an increase in     (scenario 3) they disappear in the 
long-run, ending up with the highest deficit/GDP level in 2026. The reason is that the permanent 
reduction of  G   by four points speeds up debt reduction, as we observed in Figure 2; this, under a 
fiscal feedback rule such as (8), decreases tax revenue by a greater amount, and thus, once  G   is 
stabilized at  40.16% , starts off the deficit upturn, which can be kept under control only if we increase 
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permanently the response of taxation to debt (    0.30). It is noteworthy that all the scenarios involve, 
in the long-run, a breaking of the 3% ceiling, even in presence of a (more or less pronounced) 
debt/GDP reduction.      
The dynamic of fiscal pressure confirms the above results: 
 
FIGURE 4  
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The strong reduction of tax revenue/GDP ratio under scenarios 3 and 5 (those featured by greater debt 
reduction), is the main responsible for the upraising of deficit. The feedback rule, however, leads to a 
reduction of fiscal pressure in all cases. 
Debt service is reduced according to the downturn of debt/GDP ratio. We observe the big difference 
that an increase (scenario 1) or decrease (scenario 2) of 1% in the ECB interest rate can make for public 
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finance. 
FIGURE 5  
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4.2.2. Variable steps of debt/GDP reduction 
So far we have set different macroeconomic conditions (including the fiscal policy stance) and we have 
observed how debt reduction proceeds in time. In this section we go the other way round: set different 
objectives of yearly debt reduction (under the first four scenarios), and see what fiscal policy parameter  
   is needed in order to achieve that objective. 
Manipulating equation (9), in fact: 
 
T0
Yt
 bt−11  t  gt −
Gt
Yt
 it − t − gtbt−1  Δbt
  it − t − gtbt−1  Δbt  GtYt −
T0
Yt
1  t  gt
bt−1  
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with  Δbt   being the debt reduction step (  −bt − bt−1  ). We see what happens if the government 
chooses to adopt a (more or less) drastic strategy of debt reduction, bringing down debt/GDP ratio by a 
constant amount each year. We only analyze the first three scenarios, as 4 and 5 differ exactly because 
they fix a new (and given) level for  .   
Here are the results for, respectively,  Δbt  1%   ,  which would allow debt/GDP ratio to be below the 
100% threshold by 2013, and to reach 97.15% in 2015. 
 
FIGURE 6 
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After the small decrease in 2008, the feedback parameter required to support a 1% yearly reduction of 
debt/GDP, increases over time, as it has to compensate the reduction in the stock of public debt. A 
permanent, although gradual, reduction in public expenditure (scenario 3) would allow     to be on a 
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decreasing path, at least until 2011 (at the same time, tax revenue/GDP can also decrease substantially). 
After an increase in 2008, deficit shows a decreasing path, with an interesting feature: baseline and 
scenario 3 overlap almost perfectly. In other words, if public expenditure is not permanently decreases, 
the dynamics of deficit is the same since the higher value of the     parameter compensates; however, 
as shown in the lower-left panel, tax pressure would be higher. 
If the debt reduction strategy adopts a 2% step per year, the ratio reaches 89.15% by 2015, and the 
behaviour of fiscal variables is: 
                                                                              
FIGURE 7  
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We can observe the same path as above, with the only difference being the quantitative effects, which 
are obviously stronger in this case. Tax pressure is the same, since the quicker reduction of debt/GDP 
ratio is compensated by the higher fiscal parameter. 
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5. A counterfactual application 
The two previous sections were concerned with predictions on the evolution of fiscal variables under 
different hypothesis and scenarios, assuming that the government explicitly adopted a fiscal rule such 
as equation (6). Here we ask ourselves what would have happened if such a fiscal policy rule had been 
applied in Italy in the last decade. We calibrate equation (9) using data from the time span 1994-2006. 
First we pin down the implicit parameter     on the basis of the actual debt dynamics occurred in that 
period; then we obtain simulated debt/GDP and deficit/GDP series, analyzing what would have 
happened had the government adopted explicitly our fiscal rule, with given and alternative values for 
the feedback parameter. 
Here is the table of data: 
TABLE 4 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
t
t
G
Y
 42.9% 41.7% 41.4% 41.3% 41.3% 41.7% 
T
Y
 45.1% 45.6% 45.8% 48% 46.5% 46.7% 
0
t
T
Y
 18.04% 16.46% 17.93% 18.54% 16.15% 16.21%
i 9.65% 9.21% 9.25% 7.64% 6.63% 5.75% 
tπ  3.48% 5.03% 5.28% 2.39% 2.71% 1.57% 
g 2.2% 2.9% 0.7% 1.9% 1.4% 1.9% 
iB
Y
 11.4% 11.5% 11.5% 9.4% 8% 6.7% 
G T iB
Y
− +  9.3% 7.6% 7.1% 2.7% 2.8% 1.7% 
b∆  -6.7% 0.5% 1.2% 2.5% 4% 1% 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
t
t
G
Y
 41.2% 41.8% 41.9% 43.4% 43.3% 43.9% 45.9% 
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T
Y
 45.8% 45% 44.5% 45.1% 44.6% 44.4% 46.9% 
0
t
T
Y
 15.82% 16.11% 16.25% 16.43% 16.65% 16.79% 16.8% 
i 5.62% 5.84% 5.23% 4.89% 4.89% 4.34% 4.3% 
tπ  2.19% 2.65% 3.06% 2.94% 2.62% 2% 2.2% 
g 3.6% 1.8% 0.3% 0 1.1% 0 1.9% 
iB
Y
 6.5% 6.5% 5.8% 5.3% 5.1% 4.5% 4.58% 
G T iB
Y
− +  1.9% 3.1% 2.9% 3.4% 3.4% 4.1% 4.4% 
b∆  4.3% 0.4% 2.6% 4.1% 0.4% -2.6% -0.4% 
 
 
 
 
Implicit interest rates have been calculated using the same procedure as in the previous section (i.e. 
dividing the overall debt service expenditure by the existing stock of public debt). 
Next we show the figure of the resulting implicit     from 1994 to 2006 (quantitative data to be found 
in Appendix B): 
FIGURE 8  
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Visual inspection of Figure 8 is a good way to assess Italian government's fiscal stance. Sensitivity of 
(direct and indirect) taxation to real debt/GDP ratio shows an increasing trend over the years, 
confirming the arising of the need of fiscal consolidation. In particular, we note two peaks: in 1997-
1998, corresponding to the run-up to the Maastricht criteria, and in 2003, with the approaching of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure for breaking the Stability and Growth Pact parameter. 
The following exercises show what the debt and deficit dynamics would have been, had the 
government adopted, respectively,    0.2637   (the mean over the time span) ,  0.28,  0.30.   
Simulated series are compared with the actual ones (quantitative results in Appendix B). 
FIGURE 9  
 22
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
ALTERNATIVE DEBT TRAJECTORIES FROM 1994 TO 2006
fi=0.2637
fi=0.28
fi=0.30
actual
 
 
FIGURE  10 
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Figure 9 shows that adopting an explicit fiscal rule such as (6) would have ensured a steadier reduction 
of debt/GDP ratio until 2002, with an uprising henceforth. Nevertheless, final results in 2006 would 
have been, sensibly, improved only adopting a    0.30 . With the average value (   0.2637 ), in 
fact, results would have been worse, whereas with    0.28  the final point would have been pretty 
much the same. It is noteworthy remember, however, that over the entire time span the distance 
between the actual and the simulated series is strongly in favour of the latter. 
Figure 10 shows that if the alternatives debt reductions strategies had been put in place, the 
corresponding deficit/GDP ratios would have been more often above the 3% ceiling that they had 
actually been in reality. A further confirmation that the adoption of a fiscal policy rule responding to 
real debt/GDP ratio can manage to implement a successful reduction strategy without having to "tie the 
hands" to a given numerical parameter for deficit/GDP. 
 
6. Conclusions 
After the burst of the "tax and spend" Keynesian bubble, most industrialized economies have been 
faced with the pressing need of structural adjustment of public finance's imbalances. For European 
nations, this process was mainly governed by the advancement of the European Union economic 
integration, and the establishment of the European Monetary Union at the end of the last decade, which 
required the compliance with strict public finance criteria both before and after the starting of the single 
currency. In this overall context, Italy's situation has been particularly relevant, as it entered the euro 
with a debt/GDP ratio twice as much as the average value for admission; after that, reduction strategy 
has proven to be not as aggressive and determined as needed, in order to establish a credible fiscal 
consolidation plan. 
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In this paper, we tried to investigate the consequences for Italian public finance of the adoption 
of a simple fiscal policy rule, in which the "variable" component of tax revenue (that we identify with 
fiscal pressure) responds to the accumulation of past real debt/GDP ratio, with an elasticity given by 
the crucial feedback parameter  .   Our results show that the adoption of such a rule could help 
simplifying the understanding of the fiscal policy framework, and can be summarized as follows: 
- from the policy point of view, a significant debt reduction can occur if the feedback response is 
slightly increased with respect to the recent tendency (up until  0.30 ) or if primary government 
expenditure is gradually reduced by four percentage points over the next four years. Better results, 
obviously, are achieved if the two above actions are taken jointly. Deterioration of general 
macroeconomic conditions (in particular, a rise in debt service) can significantly worsen the scenario. 
- under given conditions, sustained debt reduction can be achieved also with a deficit/GDP ratio greater 
than 3% (the SGP parameter). The basic intuition is the following: if the tax revenue is permanently set 
to respond to public debt, the initial sustained reduction of the latter will cause a reduction of the 
former. The consequent negative effects on deficit are however partially compensated by the reduction 
in the debt service, but still prevent deficit/GDP ratio to be permanently reduced. At the same time, 
fiscal pressure can be set on a decreasing path. 
- a consistent strategy of yearly one (two) per cent reduction of debt/GDP ratio would allow it to be at 
97.15% (89.15%) by 2015, but it would require a constant increase in the feedback parameter  .   
Nonetheless, fiscal pressure would remain steady, and deficit/GDP ratio would be under control. 
- given all macroeconomic variables, if a fiscal rule such as the one we put forward was adopted in 
Italy from 1994, debt/GDP reduction would have been steady and smooth, although in the last couple 
of years more aggressive measure would have been needed. That result could have been achieved even 
in presence of repeated violation of the 3% ceiling for the deficit/GDP ratio. 
This paper does not include any structural analysis, nor microfoundations. It is a fairly simple 
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computational exercise showing the benefits of the adoption of a fiscal rule responding to debt/GDP 
accumulation. However, we believe it can be a contribution to the understanding of the real policy 
action needed in order to achieve a sustainable fiscal position and, at the same time, alleviate tax 
pressure on economic agents. Future research in this field can include the extensions of the comparative 
analysis at the EMU level, and a greater effort to strengthen the policy forecast of fully-microfounded 
models. 
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Appendix A: Derivations 
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Derivations of the dynamic of real debt/GDP ratio 
Start from equation (1): 
                                                          Bt  1  itBt−1  PtGt − Tt                                        
Divide both sides by the current real GDP ( PtYt  ): 
                                                   
Bt
PtYt
 1  it Bt−1PtYt 
Gt − Tt
Yt                                              (A1) 
which can be seen as: 
  
Bt
PtYt
 1  it Bt−1Pt−1Yt−1
Pt−1
Pt
Yt−1
Yt
 Gt − TtYt  
                                                                                                                                                             (A2) 
It is also well known that: 
Pt−1
Pt
 11  t
Yt−1
Yt
 11  gt  
where: 
 t  = rate of inflation at time  t   
 gt  = rate of growth of real GDP at time  t   
Plugging those expression is (A2): 
                                                     
bt  1  it1  t1  gt bt−1 
Gt − Tt
Yt                                           (A3) 
 
where  bt,t−1    real debt/GDP ratio 
Exploiting the well-known approximations: 
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1  t1  gt ≈ 1  t  gt
1  it
1  t  gt ≈ 1  it − t − gt  
we get to equation (1): 
bt  bt−1  it − t − gtbt−1  Gt − TtYt  
Appendix B: Other Tables 
Evolution of fiscal variables over time 
Table B1 
Baseline scenario 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 103.94% 2.79% 46.14% -1.95% 4.74%
2009 103.06% 3.07% 45.81% -1.62% 4.69%
2010 102.42% 3.15% 45.57% -1.38% 4.65%
2011 101.60% 3.42% 45.39% -1.20% 4.62%
2012 101.35% 3.61% 45.16% -0.97% 4.60%
2013 101.17% 3.67% 45.09% -0.90% 4.56%
2014 101.03% 3.71% 45.04% -0.85% 4.56%
2015 100.93% 3.74% 45% -0.81% 4.56%
2016 100.86% 3.76% 44.98% -0.79% 4.55%
2017 100.81% 3.78% 44.96% -0.77% 4.55%
2018 100.77% 3.79% 44.94% -0.75% 4.55%
2019 100.74% 3.80% 44.93% -0.74% 4.54%
2020 100.72% 3.81% 44.92% -0.73% 4.54%
2021 100.71% 3.81% 44.92% -0.73% 4.54%
2022 100.70% 3.82% 44.92% -0.73% 4.54%
2023 100.69% 3.82% 44.91% -0.72% 4.54%
2024 100.68% 3.82% 44.91% -0.72% 4.54%
2025 100.68% 3.82% 44.91% -0.72% 4.54%
2026 100.68% 3.82% 44.91% -0.72% 4.54%
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Table B2: Scenario 1 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 105.23% 3.76% 46.23% -2.04% 5.79%
2009 105.28% 3.74% 46.25% -2.06% 5.80%
2010 105.33% 3.73% 46.26% -2.07% 5.80%
2011 105.36% 3.72% 46.28% -2.09% 5.80%
2012 105.38% 3.71% 46.28% -2.09% 5.81%
2013 105.40% 3.71% 46.29% -2.10% 5.81%
2014 105.41% 3.70% 46.30% -2.11% 5.81%
2015 105.42% 3.70% 46.30% -2.11% 5.81%
2016 105.43% 3.70% 46.30% -2.11% 5.81%
2017 105.44% 3.69% 46.30% -2.11% 5.81%
2018 105.44% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2019 105.44% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2020 105.44% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2021 105.44% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2022 105.44% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2023 105.45% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2024 105.45% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2025 105.45% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
2026 105.45% 3.69% 46.31% -2.12% 5.81%
 
Table B3: Scenario 2 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 102.74% 1.79% 46.09% -1.90% 3.69%
2009 101% 2.37% 45.42% -1.23% 3.61%
2010 99.75% 2.79% 44.94% -0.75% 3.55%
2011 98.86% 3.09% 44.60% -0.41% 3.50%
2012 98.21% 3.31% 44.35% -0.16% 3.47%
2013 97.74% 3.46% 44.17% 0.02% 3.45%
2014 97.41% 3.58% 44.05% 0.14% 3.43%
2015 97.17% 3.66% 43.95% 0.24% 3.42%
2016 97% 3.71% 43.89% 0.30% 3.41%
2017 96.78% 3.76% 43.84% 0.35% 3.40%
2018 96.72% 3.79% 43.80% 0.39% 3.40%
2019 96.67% 3.81% 43.78% 0.41% 3.40%
2020 96.66% 3.82% 43.76% 0.43% 3.39%
2021 96.61% 3.83% 43.75% 0.44% 3.39%
2022 96.60% 3.84% 43.74% 0.45% 3.39%
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2023 96.58% 3.85% 43.73% 0.46% 3.39%
2024 96.58% 3.85% 43.73% 0.46% 3.39%
2025 96.57% 3.85% 43.72% 0.46% 3.39%
2026 96.56% 3.86% 43.72% 0.47% 3.39%
 
 
Table B4: Scenario 3 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 102.94% 1.79% 46.14% -2.95% 4.74%
2009 100.33% 1.30% 45.53% -3.34% 4.64%
2010 97.42% 0.9% 44.81% -3.62% 4.52%
2011 94.29% 0.58% 44.01% -3.82% 4.39%
2012 90.80% 1.30% 43.14% -2.95% 4.25%
2013 88.29% 2.11% 42.18% -1.99% 4.09%
2014 86.49% 2.69% 41.49% -1.30% 3.98%
2015 85.20% 3.10% 40.99% -0.80% 3.90%
2016 84.27% 3.40% 40.63% -0.44% 3.84%
2017 83.60% 3.62% 40.38% -0.19% 3.80%
2018 83.12% 3.77% 40.19% 0% 3.77%
2019 82.78% 3.88% 40.06% 0.13% 3.75%
2020 82.53% 3.96% 39.96% 0.23% 3.73%
2021 82.35% 4.02% 39.90% 0.29% 3.72%
2022 82.23% 4.06% 39.85% 0.34% 3.71%
2023 82.07% 4.09% 39.81% 0.38% 3.71%
2024 82.02% 4.11% 39.79% 0.40% 3.70%
2025 81.99% 4.12% 39.77% 0.42% 3.70%
2026 81.97% 4.13% 39.76% 0.43% 3.70%
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Table B5: Scenario 4 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 102.60% 1.44% 47.49% -3.30% 4.74%
2009 100.76% 2.06% 46.75% -2.56% 4.63%
2010 99.45% 2.51% 46.22% -2.03% 4.54%
2011 98.50% 2.83% 45.84% -1.38% 4.49%
2012 97.82% 3.06% 45.57% -1.18% 4.44%
2013 96.98% 3.23% 45.37% -1.04% 4.41%
2014 96.55% 3.35% 45.23% -0.94% 4.39%
2015 96.42% 3.43% 45.13% -0.87% 4.37%
2016 96.33% 3.50% 45.06% -0.82% 4.36%
2017 96.26% 3.54% 44.01% -0.78% 4.35%
2018 96.21% 3.57% 44.97% -0.75% 4.35%
2019 96.18% 3.59% 44.94% -0.73% 4.34%
2020 96.16% 3.61% 44.92% -0.72% 4.34%
2021 96.14% 3.62% 44.91% -0.71% 4.34%
2022 96.12% 3.63% 44.90% -0.70% 4.34%
2023 96.11% 3.64% 44.89% -0.70% 4.34%
2024 96.10% 3.64% 44.89% -0.69% 4.34%
2025 96.10% 3.64% 44.88% -0.69% 4.33%
2026 96.10% 3.65% 44.88% -0.69% 4.33%
 
Table B6: Scenario 5 
 
YEAR t
t
B
Y
 t
t
D
Y
 t
t
T
Y
 t t
t
G T
Y
− 1t t
t
i B
Y
−  
2007 105.15% 2.41% 46.60% -2.41% 4.82%
2008 101.60% 0.44% 47.49% -4.30% 4.74%
2009 98.05% 0.31% 46.46% -4.27% 4.58%
2010 94.50% 0.17% 45.44% -4.25% 4.42%
2011 90.95% 0% 44.41% -4.22% 4.26%
2012 88.40% 0.91% 43.39% -3.20% 4.10%
2013 86.57% 1.53% 42.65% -2.46% 3.99%
2014 85.25% 1.97% 42.12% -1.93% 3.90%
2015 84.31% 2.30% 41.74% -1.55% 3.84%
2016 83.63% 2.53% 41.47% -1.28% 3.80%
2017 83.14% 2.69% 41.27% -1.08% 3.77%
2018 82.79% 2.81% 41.13% -0.94% 3.75%
2019 82.54% 2.90% 41.03% -0.84% 3.73%
2020 82.36% 2.96% 40.96% -0.77% 3.72%
2021 82.23% 3% 40.90% -0.71% 3.71%
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2022 82.14% 3.03% 40.87% -0.68% 3.71%
2023 82.07% 3.05% 40.84% -0.65% 3.70%
2024 82.02% 3.07% 40.82% -0.63% 3.70%
2025 81.99% 3.08% 40.81% -0.62% 3.70%
2026 81.97% 3.09% 40.80% -0.61% 3.70%
 
 
Table B7 
Implicit feedback parameter calculated for 1994-2006 
 
YEAR φ  
1994 0.2045 
1995 0.2364 
1996 0.2450 
1997 0.2489 
1998 0.2779 
1999 0.2587 
2000 0.2698 
2001 0.2594 
2002 0.2826 
2003 0.3154 
2004 0.2814 
2005 0.2647 
2006 0.2834 
 
 
 
 
Table B8 
Actual and simulated debt/GDP ratios 1994-2006 
 
YEAR 
0.2637
B
Y φ=
 
0.28
B
Y φ=
 
0.30
B
Y φ=
 
actual
B
Y
 
1994 117.77% 116.36% 114.12% 124.8%
1995 115.74% 112.90% 109.10% 124.3%
1996 114.20% 110.23% 105.25% 123.1%
1997 111.91% 107.09% 101.26% 120.6%
1998 111.53% 106.14% 99.78% 116.6%
1999 111.14% 105.33% 98.61% 115.6%
2000 108.63% 102.65% 95.86% 111.3%
2001 108.40% 102.25% 95.35% 110.9%
2002 108.42% 102.11% 95.11% 108.3%
2003 109.73% 103.30% 96.62% 104.2%
2004 109.77% 103.27% 96.45% 103.8%
2005 111.07% 104.45% 96.63% 106.4%
2006 112.31% 105.71% 98.13% 106.8%
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Table B9 
Actual and simulated deficit/GDP ratios 1994-2006 
 
YEAR 
0.2637
D
Y φ=
 
0.28
D
Y φ=
 
0.30
D
Y φ=
 
actual
D
Y
1994 6.79% 4.97% 2.73% 9.3% 
1995 7.31% 5.77% 4.03% 7.6% 
1996 5.38% 4.08% 2.68% 7.1% 
1997 2.61% 1.59% 0.52% 2.7% 
1998 4.22% 3.45% 2.68% 2.8% 
1999 3.48% 2.87% 2.30% 1.7% 
2000 3.92% 3.42% 2.96% 1.9% 
2001 4.61% 4.17% 3.76% 3.1% 
2002 3.66% 3.30% 2.96% 2.9% 
2003 4.50% 4.19% 3.90% 3.4% 
2004 4.12% 3.81% 3.43% 3.4% 
2005 3.50% 3.24% 2.93% 4.1% 
2006 5.79% 5.55% 5.46% 4.4% 
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